Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort Game
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- Cary Deck & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2012. "Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 71-88, March.
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More about this item
Keywordsminimum effort game; information uncertainty; real time monitoring; circle network; cheap talk;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-10-30 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-10-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-10-30 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2010-10-30 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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