Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game
We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome when no assignment is made. However, the majority of them always coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome when an assignment is made. This happens regardless of whether the assignment is “almost common knowledge” or “common knowledge”.
Volume (Year): 3 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Rydval, Ondrej & Ortmann, Andreas, 2005. "Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 101-107, July.
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