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Social Interaction Promotes Risk Taking in a Stag Hunt Game

Author

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  • Bolton Gary E.

    (University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, United States of America)

  • Feldhaus Christoph
  • Ockenfels Axel

    (University of Cologne, Köln, Germany)

Abstract

We demonstrate that people are more willing to take risks in a stag hunt game when the agent of uncertainty is another person, thereby promoting cooperation. Recent social cognition research suggests an explanation for this pattern, which is based on the idea that games that align interests between subjects activate a trust mindset.

Suggested Citation

  • Bolton Gary E. & Feldhaus Christoph & Ockenfels Axel, 2016. "Social Interaction Promotes Risk Taking in a Stag Hunt Game," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 409-423, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:germec:v:17:y:2016:i:3:p:409-423
    DOI: 10.1111/geer.12095
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    Cited by:

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    2. Claudia Keser & Alexia Gaudeul, 2016. "Foreword: Special Issue in Honor of Reinhard Selten's 85th Birthday," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 277-283, August.
    3. Ockenfels, Axel & Schier, Uta K., 2020. "Games as frames," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 97-106.
    4. Sebastian Berger & Christoph Feldhaus & Axel Ockenfels, 2018. "A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 63-72, July.
    5. Wenbo Zou & Xue Xu, 2023. "Ingroup bias in a social learning experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 27-54, March.
    6. Jeffrey V. Butler & Joshua B. Miller, 2018. "Social Risk and the Dimensionality of Intentions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2787-2796, June.
    7. Takeharu Sogo, 2019. "Competition among procrastinators," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 325-337, May.
    8. Schuch, Esther & Dirks, Simone & Nhim, Tum & Richter, Andries, 2021. "Cooperation under social and strategic uncertainty – The role of risk and social capital in rural Cambodia," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    9. Li, Chen & Turmunkh, Uyanga & Wakker, Peter P., 2020. "Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 272-287.

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