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Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

  • Chaudhuri, A.
  • Schotter, A.
  • Sopher, B.

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-11.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 01-11.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:01-11
Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers 00-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  2. Bryant, John, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-28, August.
  3. John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
  4. Shotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach," Working Papers 01-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-91, June.
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