Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from simple stag-hunt games
We investigate experimentally the conjecture that loss avoidance solves the tension in stag-hunt games for which payoff dominance and risk dominance make conflicting predictions. Contrary to received textbook wisdom, money-losing outcomes do shift behavior, albeit not strongly, toward the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
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