Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the payoff-dominant outcome. We find that coordination is most likely to result when the advice is made public and also distributed in a manner that makes it common knowledge. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.
Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 534 (01)
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