Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism
Through a model that distinguishes between privately-held and publicly-declared preferences, and between private and public beliefs, this paper explains why a society might c ling to its past choices. All four variables are endogenous to the mo del. Following the introduction of a measure of collective conservati sm, the paper turns to the determinants and consequences of feedback from society's choices to its members' private beliefs and preference s. The theory is applied to the persistence of India's caste system t o explain why the lowest castes have been among the system's most com mitted supporters. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 97 (1987)
Issue (Month): 387 (September)
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