Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cooper,Russell, 1999.
"Coordination Games,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967, Enero.
- Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521570176, June.
- Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990.
"Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
- John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
- J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2001. "Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 345-351, December.
- Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Riechmann, Thomas & Weimann, Joachim, 2008.
"Competition as a coordination device: Experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 437-454, June.
- Thomas Riechmann & Joachim Weimann, 2004. "Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Game Theory and Information 0405011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007.
"When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CEEL Working Papers 0605, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp302, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2010.
"Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1892-1912, September.
- Feri, Francesco & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sutter, Matthias, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3741, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2008-22, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2016.
"Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 737-767.
- Arno Riedl & Ingrid M.T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2011. "Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games," Working Papers 201103, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
- Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2011. "Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 3685, CESifo.
- Riedl, Arno & Rohde, Ingrid M.T. & Strobel, Martin, 2011. "Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games," IZA Discussion Papers 6223, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Riedl, A.M. & Rohde, I.M.T. & Strobel, M., 2011. "Efficient coordination in weakest-link games," Research Memorandum 057, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Anke Gerbery & Thorsten Hensz & Bodo Vogtx, 2010. "Rational Investor Sentimentina Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00911824, HAL.
- Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Gerber, Anke & Hens, Thorsten & Vogt, Bodo, 2010. "Rational investor sentiment in a repeated stochastic game with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 669-704, December.
- Giovanna Devetag, 2003.
"Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June.
- Maria Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study," CEEL Working Papers 0214, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Savikhin, Anya C. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012.
"Behavioral spillovers in coordination games,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 233-245.
- Timothy Cason & Anya Samek & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," Artefactual Field Experiments 00423, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cason, Timothy & Savikhin, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," MPRA Paper 52106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Timothy N. Cason & Anya C. Savikhin & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," Working Papers 11-20, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Çule, Monika & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 811-822, December.
- Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020.
"One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 113-129, January.
- Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov & Maoliang Ye, 2010. "One step at a time: Does gradualism build coordination?," Framed Field Experiments 00188, The Field Experiments Website.
- Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Papers 2006.01386, arXiv.org.
- Ye, Maoliang & Zheng, Jie & Nikolov, Plamen & Asher, Samuel, 2019. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," IZA Discussion Papers 12508, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov, 2011. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Working Papers 1113, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Thomas Riechmann, 2005. "Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices," Game Theory and Information 0503010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cary Deck & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2012.
"Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 71-88, March.
- Cary Deck & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2010. "Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort Game," Working Papers 10-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Faravelli, Marco & Stanca, Luca, 2012.
"When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 170-183.
- Marco Faravelli & Luca Stanca, 2010. "When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests," Discussion Papers Series 412, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Marco Faravelli & Luca Stanca, 2010. "When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests," Working Papers 197, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2010.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia, 2002. "Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-205, May.
- Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 2000. "Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-36, CIRANO.
- Ailin Leng & Lana Friesen & Kenan Kalayci & Priscilla Man, 2018. "A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 549-572, September.
- Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013.
"Coordination failures in immigration policy,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
- Giordani, Paolo E. & Rutaz, Michele, 2011. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-02, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
- Paolo E. Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2011. "Coordination Failures in Immigration Policy," Working Papers CELEG 1101, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
- Paolo Giordani & Michele Ruta, 2011. "Coordination Failures in Immigration Policy," Working Papers LuissLab 1190, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:2:p:227-232. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.