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Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms

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  • Ewerhart Christian

    (Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Schönberggasse 1, CH-8001 Zürich, Switzerland)

Abstract

The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and strategic forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n≥4$n \ge 4$ firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n=3$n = 3$ and n→∞$n \to \infty $, the equilibrium for a finite number of n≥4$n \ge 4$ firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewerhart Christian, 2015. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 457-472, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:457-472:n:10
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2014. "Mixed equilibria in runoff elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 619-623.
    2. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
    3. G. Elliott & C. Granger & A. Timmermann (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of Economic Forecasting," Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    4. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1975. "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(1), pages 27-49.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tarbush, Bassel, 2018. "Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 222-240.
    2. Behringer, Stefan & Filistrucchi, Lapo, 2015. "Hotelling competition and political differentiation with more than two newspapers," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 36-49.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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