Elections and strategic positioning games
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Other versions of this item:
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 1999. "Elections and Strategic Positioning Games," Working Papers mwooders-00-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Page, Jr Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H, 1999. "Elections And Strategic Positioning Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 545, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Osborne Martin J., 1993.
"Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
- Martin J. Osborne, 1992. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 1992-02, McMaster University.
- Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
More about this item
KeywordsFarsighted stability; political common agency games;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
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