Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games
It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997.
"On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms,"
299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
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