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Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification

Author

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  • Frederic Koessler

    (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

Abstract

This note compares public and private information certification in a simple class of communication games with one sender and two receivers. It also emphasizes the role of belief consistency conditions in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of such games.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification," THEMA Working Papers 2006-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-12
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2006-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-1223, December.
    8. Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
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    10. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    11. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    12. Newman, P & Sansing, R, 1993. "Disclosure Policies With Multiple Users," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 92-112.
    13. Gigler, F, 1994. "Self-Enforcing Voluntary Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 224-240.
    14. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl Schlag, 2003. "Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(4), pages 511-526, September.
    15. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2004. "It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29, March.
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    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/168 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    3. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    4. Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma," Working Papers 2010-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    6. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    7. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    8. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    10. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
    11. Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
    12. Orhun, Eda, 2019. "Voluntary disclosure and market competition: Theory and evidence from the U.S. services sector," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 354-370.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Certifiable information; cheap talk; consistency of beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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