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Motivated Skepticism

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  • Hagenbach, Jeanne
  • ,

Abstract

We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Skepticism is lower when skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than in neutral settings. When skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not enhanced compared to neutral settings. These results demonstrate that individuals' exercise of skepticism depends on the conclusions of skeptical inferences.

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  • Hagenbach, Jeanne & ,, 2022. "Motivated Skepticism," CEPR Discussion Papers 17478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17478
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    Cited by:

    1. Huang, Wei & Wang, Yu & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2024. "Motivated Beliefs, Independence and Cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure games; Hard information; Unraveling result; Skepticism; Motivated beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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