IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pha710.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Jeanne Hagenbach

Personal Details

First Name:Jeanne
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hagenbach
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pha710
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/hagenbachjeanne/
Département d'Economie, Ecole Polytechnique 91128 Palaiseau Cedex - France
Terminal Degree:2009 Paris School of Economics (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST)

France
http://crest.science/

: 01 41 17 60 81

Bâtiment ENSAE, 5 rue Henry LE Chatelier, 91120 Palaiseau
RePEc:edi:crestfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Post-Print hal-01629300, HAL.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Post-Print hal-01629301, HAL.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Post-Print hal-01629311, HAL.
  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01053478, HAL.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
  7. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2010. "Centralizing Information in Networks," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 313, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 882-909, October.
  4. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  6. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2011. "Centralizing information in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 149-162, May.
  7. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Coordination stratégique et connaissance commune dans les réseaux de communication," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 10-10.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2015. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 21099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schwardmann, Peter & Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Competitive pricing and quality disclosure to cursed consumers," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145573, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Post-Print hal-01629301, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.

  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Post-Print hal-01629311, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo Group Munich.

  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01053478, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
    2. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2014-041, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    4. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    5. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    6. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Voting Rules," Working Papers 904, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    8. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.
    9. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
    10. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
    12. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    13. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    14. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 × 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Debdatta Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(3), pages 1-21, September.
    16. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    17. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    18. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
    19. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    20. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    21. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    22. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
    23. Seda Ertac & Mert Gumren & Levent Kockesen, 2017. "Strategic Feedback in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1714, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.

  6. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2010. "Centralizing Information in Networks," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 313, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491930, HAL.
    2. Foerster, Manuel, 0. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

  7. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
    2. Kaniska Dam & Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2011. "A Note on Bargaining over Complementary Pieces of Information in Networks," Working papers DTE 504, CIDE, División de Economía.
    3. Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann & Stefan Kölßner, 2014. "Opinion Dynamics and Wisdom under Conformity," Working Papers 2014.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Myatt, David P & Wallace, Chris, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 32, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    5. Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2015. "Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 701-732, August.
    6. Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel & Dai, Anovia Yifan, 2016. "Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-66.
    7. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    8. Nikolas Tsakas, 2014. "Diffusion by imitation: the importance of targeting agents," Gecomplexity Discussion Paper Series 3, Action IS1104 "The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation", revised Nov 2014.
    9. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jurjen Kamphorst & Sudipta Sarangi, 2017. "Network formation when players seek confirmation of information," Post-Print halshs-01660674, HAL.
    10. Edoardo Gallo, 2014. "Communication networks in markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1431, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. Garcia, Daniel, 2012. "Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks," MPRA Paper 55481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2014.
    12. Salvatore Piccolo, 2011. "Communicating Vertical Hierarchies: the Adverse Selection Case," CSEF Working Papers 273, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    13. Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman E, Ozdaglar, 2010. "Dynamics of Information Exchange in Endogenous Social Networks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000216, David K. Levine.
    14. Choi, Syngjoo & Lee, Jihong, 2009. "Communication, Coordination and Networks," MPRA Paper 19055, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. De Martí, Joan & Zenou, Yves, 2014. "Network Games with Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10290, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Michel Grabisch & Antoine Mandel & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2015. "Strategic influence in social networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01158168, HAL.
    17. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    18. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
    19. Fang, Aili & Wang, Lin & Zhao, Jiuhua & Wang, Xiaofan, 2013. "Chaos in social learning with multiple true states," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(22), pages 5786-5792.
    20. Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2007. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200801, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Oct 2008.
    21. Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
    22. Syngjoo Choi & Edoardo Gallo & Shachar Kariv, 2015. "Networks in the laboratory," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1551, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    23. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
    24. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    25. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
    26. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
    27. Zenou, Yves, 2012. "Networks in Economics," CEPR Discussion Papers 9021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    29. Salvatore Piccolo & Emanuele Tarantino, 2011. "Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good?," CSEF Working Papers 294, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    30. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2012. "Games on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 9127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Consensus in Communication Networks under Bayesian Updating," Working papers DTE 529, CIDE, División de Economía.
    32. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    33. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    34. Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & de Martí, Joan & Prat, Andrea, 2015. "Communication and influence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    35. Foerster, Manuel, 0. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    36. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    37. Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden, 2015. "Movers and Shakers," Discussion Papers 2015-18, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    38. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 455-485, May.
    39. Nicole Tabasso, 2015. "Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation," Working Papers 2015.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    40. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2015. "Organizing to adapt and compete," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58647, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    41. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    42. Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali, 2010. "Spread of (mis)information in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 194-227, November.
    43. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Anticipating Future Expected Utility and Coordination Motives for Information Decisions in Networks," Working papers DTE 536, CIDE, División de Economía.

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2011. "Centralizing information in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 149-162, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (6) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2010-04-17 2011-04-30 2012-01-03 2012-12-06. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2011-04-30 2012-12-06 2018-06-11. Author is listed
  3. NEP-NET: Network Economics (4) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2010-04-17 2011-04-30
  4. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (3) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2011-04-30
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-01-03 2012-12-06
  6. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (2) 2009-05-23 2010-04-17
  7. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2018-06-11
  8. NEP-ICT: Information & Communication Technologies (1) 2010-04-17

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Jeanne Hagenbach should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.