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Jeanne Hagenbach

Personal Details

First Name:Jeanne
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hagenbach
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pha710
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/hagenbachjeanne/
Department of Economics, Sciences Po Paris 28 rue des Saints-Pères 75007 Paris
Terminal Degree:2009 Paris School of Economics (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Sciences économiques
Sciences Po

Paris, France
https://www.sciencespo.fr/department-economics/
RePEc:edi:cfmspfr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Post-Print hal-01629300, HAL.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Post-Print hal-01629301, HAL.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Post-Print hal-01629311, HAL.
  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
  7. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2010. "Centralizing Information in Networks," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 313, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.

    repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4kpa2fek478tla1o86g6n9jb6v is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01313702 is not listed on IDEAS
    repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
  2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 882-909, October.
  5. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
  7. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2011. "Centralizing information in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 149-162, May.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
  9. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Coordination stratégique et connaissance commune dans les réseaux de communication," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 10-10.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with Evidence in the Lab," CEPR Discussion Papers 12927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "The Way People Lie in Markets: Detectable vs. Deniable Lies," Working Papers halshs-03512300, HAL.
    2. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions," MPRA Paper 98256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Kai Barron & Tilman Fries, 2023. "Narrative Persuasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 10206, CESifo.
    5. Valeria Burdea & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2020. "Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 2020-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Marvin Deversi & Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Spin Doctors: A Model and an Experimental Investigation of Vague Disclosure," CESifo Working Paper Series 7244, CESifo.
    7. Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2015. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 21099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Sun, Keh-Kuan & Papadokonstantaki, Stella, 2023. "Lying aversion and vague communication: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    9. Deversi, Marvin & Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021. "Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    10. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03770685, HAL.
    11. Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020. "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 329-367.
    12. Schwardmann, Peter & Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Competitive pricing and quality disclosure to cursed consumers," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145573, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Working Papers hal-03770685, HAL.
    14. Keh-Kuan Sun & Stella Papadokonstantaki, 2023. "Lying Aversion and Vague Communication: An Experimental Study," Papers 2301.00372, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    15. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2020. "Rules and Commitment in Communications: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 2020-76, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    16. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03770685, HAL.
    17. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo.
    18. Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion," Working Papers 2405, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    19. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    20. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
    21. Daniel H. Wood, 2022. "Communication-Enhancing Vagueness," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-27, June.
    22. Vollstaedt, Ulrike & Imcke, Patrick & Brendel, Franziska & Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane, 2020. "Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism," Ruhr Economic Papers 887, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

  2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Post-Print hal-01629300, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Paul M. Anglin & Yanmin Gao, 2023. "Value of Communication and Social Media: An Equilibrium Theory of Messaging," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 861-903, May.

  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Post-Print hal-01629301, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ahçi, Mustafa, 2023. "Essays on corporate disclosures, innovation, and investments," Other publications TiSEM 0dddb5f7-17e1-41ba-97da-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.
    3. Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023. "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Post-Print hal-01629311, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Nageeb Ali, S. & Lewis, Greg & Vasserman, Shoshana, 2022. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," Research Papers 3890, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Deversi, Marvin & Ispano, Alessandro & Schwardmann, Peter, 2021. "Spin doctors: An experiment on vague disclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03770685, HAL.
    4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Working Papers hal-03770685, HAL.
    5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03770685, HAL.
    6. Kun Zhang, 2022. "Withholding Verifiable Information," Papers 2206.09918, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    7. Alessandro Ispano & Peter Schwardmann, 2018. "Competition over Cursed Consumers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7046, CESifo.

  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Competing with Equivocal Information," Working Papers hal-00675126, HAL.
    2. Shuo Liu & Dimitri Migrow, 2019. "Designing organizations in volatile markets," ECON - Working Papers 319, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Liang Guo, 2021. "Partial Unraveling and Strategic Contract Timing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(12), pages 7719-7736, December.
    5. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
    6. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01490688, HAL.
    7. , & Frechette, Guilaume & Perego, Jacopo, 2019. "Rules and Commitment in Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 14085, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Skreta, Vasiliki & Koessler, Frédéric, 2021. "Information Design by an Informed Designer," CEPR Discussion Papers 15709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02302036, HAL.
    10. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    11. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    12. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021. "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," Working Papers halshs-03151009, HAL.
    13. Eliaz, Kfir & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 167-170.
    14. Nageeb Ali, S. & Lewis, Greg & Vasserman, Shoshana, 2022. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," Research Papers 3890, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    15. Pogorelskiy. Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share : How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1199, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Moon, Ji-Woong, 2023. "Strategic referrals and on-the-job search equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 135-151.
    17. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
    18. Gieczewski, Germán, 2022. "Verifiable communication on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    19. Stahl, Konrad & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," Working Papers 14-26, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    20. Miura, Shintaro, 2014. "A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-68.
    21. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    22. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Raghavan, Madhav, 2020. "Influence in private-goods allocation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-28.
    24. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Madhav Raghavan, 2023. "Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 376, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    25. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    26. Tan, Xu, 2016. "Information revelation in auctions with common and private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 147-165.
    27. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03770685, HAL.
    28. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    29. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
    30. Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2023. "Informed Information Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(11), pages 3186-3232.
    31. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    32. Rastislav Rehak & Maxim Senkov, 2021. "Form of Preference Misalignment Linked to State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp708, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    33. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 345-363.
    34. Kolotilin, Anton, 2015. "Experimental design to persuade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 215-226.
    35. Madhav Raghavan, 2018. "Influence in Private-Good Economies," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    36. Pogorelskiy, Kirill & Shum, Matthew, 2019. "News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 427, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    37. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    38. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
    39. Leister, C. Matthew, 2020. "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 453-475.
    40. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Working Papers hal-03770685, HAL.
    41. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
    42. Guillaume R. Fréchette & Alessandro Lizzeri & Jacopo Perego, 2020. "Rules and Commitment in Communications: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 2020-76, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    43. Jeanne Hagenbach & Charlotte Saucet, 2024. "Motivated Skepticism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03770685, HAL.
    44. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
    45. Huihui Ding & Marcus Pivato, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Post-Print hal-03637874, HAL.
    46. Miura, Shintaro, 2019. "Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 306-338.
    47. Hedlund, Jonas, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 229-268.
    48. Creane, Anthony & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Sim, Kyoungbo, 2022. "Welfare effects of product certification under latent adverse selection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    49. Debdatta Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2018. "Coordination and Private Information Revelation," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-21, September.
    50. Bond, Philip & Zeng, Yao, 2022. "Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 178-193.
    51. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    52. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    53. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    54. Ertac, Seda & Gümren, Mert & Koçkesen, Levent, 2019. "Strategic feedback in teams: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 1-23.
    55. Liu, Shuo & Migrow, Dimitri, 2022. "When does centralization undermine adaptation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    56. Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
    57. Hedlund, Jonas, 2014. "Bayesian signaling," Working Papers 0577, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    58. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Post-Print halshs-01490688, HAL.

  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 47-56, April.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Post-Print halshs-01053478, HAL.
    3. Nana Adrian & Marc Möller, 2020. "Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 315-334, April.
    4. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2022. "Why don’t we talk about it? Communication and coordination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 257-278.

  7. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2010. "Centralizing Information in Networks," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 313, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491930, HAL.
    2. Mauleon, Ana & Schopohl, Simon & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020. "Competition for leadership in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 19-33.
    3. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Post-Print halshs-01491930, HAL.
    4. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17014, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.

  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann & Stefan Kölßner, 2014. "Opinion Dynamics and Wisdom under Conformity," Working Papers 2014.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Luca P. Merlino & Paolo Pin & Nicole Tabasso, 2020. "Debunking Rumors in Networks," Papers 2010.01018, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    3. Kakhbod, Ali & Loginova, Uliana, 2023. "When does introducing verifiable communication choices improve welfare?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 139-162.
    4. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    5. Nikolas Tsakas, 2014. "Diffusion by imitation: the importance of targeting agents," Gecomplexity Discussion Paper Series 3, Action IS1104 "The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation", revised Nov 2014.
    6. A.K.S. Chand & Sergio Currarini & Giovanni Ursino, 2015. "Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def024, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    7. Gallo, Edoardo, 2020. "Communication networks in markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    8. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2015. "Organizing to Adapt and Compete," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 158-187, May.
    9. Gadi Barlevy & Fernando Alvarez, 2014. "Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion," 2014 Meeting Papers 115, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Post-Print halshs-01053478, HAL.
    11. Choi, Syngjoo & Lee, Jihong, 2009. "Communication, Coordination and Networks," MPRA Paper 19055, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Michel Grabisch & Antoine Mandel & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Emily Tanimura, 2015. "Strategic influence in social networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01158168, HAL.
    13. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    14. de Martí, Joan & Milán, Pau, 2019. "Regime change in large information networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 262-284.
    15. Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2007. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200801, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Oct 2008.
    16. Wang, Yun, 2013. "The result of world powers in WTO: A cheap-talk game under different communication protocols," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 192-207.
    17. Francis Bloch & Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448, May.
    18. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations," PSE Working Papers halshs-00652279, HAL.
    19. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin, 2022. "Pledges and how social influence shapes their effectiveness," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    20. Gieczewski, Germán, 2022. "Verifiable communication on networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    21. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
    22. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.
    23. Zenou, Yves, 2012. "Networks in Economics," CEPR Discussion Papers 9021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan & Mathieu Faure, 2022. "Do people share opportunities?," Working Papers hal-03921232, HAL.
    25. Zenou, Yves & Jackson, Matthew O., 2012. "Games on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 9127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Consensus in Communication Networks under Bayesian Updating," Working Papers DTE 529, CIDE, División de Economía.
    27. Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio & Melguizo-López, Isabel, 2022. "Making friends: The role of assortative interests and capacity constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 431-465.
    28. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    29. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    30. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    31. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "On Information Aggregation in International Alliances," AMSE Working Papers 1855, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
    32. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2017. "Network formation when players seek confirmation of information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 20-31.
    33. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    34. Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. & Ponti, Giovanni & Vega-Redondo, Fernando & Yu, Haihan, 2020. "Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 582-596.
    35. Robert Akerlof & Richard Holden, 2015. "Movers and Shakers," Discussion Papers 2015-18, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    36. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 455-485, May.
    37. Tabasso, Nicole, 2019. "Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 219-240.
    38. Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2010. "Dynamics of Information Exchange in Endogenous Social Networks," NBER Working Papers 16410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    39. Kaniska Dam & Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2012. "A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3098-3110.
    40. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    41. Acemoglu, Daron & Ozdaglar, Asuman & ParandehGheibi, Ali, 2010. "Spread of (mis)information in social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 194-227, November.
    42. Fang, Aili & Wang, Lin & Wei, Xinjiang, 2019. "Social learning with multiple true states," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 375-386.
    43. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
    44. Myatt, David P & Wallace, Chris, 2017. "Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 32, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    45. Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2015. "Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 701-732, August.
    46. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints," AMSE Working Papers 1856, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
    47. Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel & Dai, Anovia Yifan, 2016. "Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-66.
    48. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "On Information Aggregation in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962197, HAL.
    49. Edoardo Gallo, 2014. "Communication networks in markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1431, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    50. Marcos Agurto & Habiba Djebbari & Sudipta Sarangi & Brenda Silupu & Carolina Trivelli & Javier Torres, 2020. "Local ambassadors promote mobile banking in Northern Peru," Working Papers 2020-6, Lima School of Economics.
    51. Garcia, Daniel, 2012. "Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks," MPRA Paper 55481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2014.
    52. Salvatore Piccolo, 2011. "Communicating Vertical Hierarchies: the Adverse Selection Case," CSEF Working Papers 273, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    53. Joan de Martí & Yves Zenou, 2015. "Network games with incomplete information," Post-Print hal-04329656, HAL.
    54. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    55. Leister, C. Matthew, 2020. "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 453-475.
    56. Bravard, Christophe & Durieu, Jacques & Sarangi, Sudipta & Sémirat, Stéphan, 2023. "False information from near and far," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 152-174.
    57. Fang, Aili & Wang, Lin & Zhao, Jiuhua & Wang, Xiaofan, 2013. "Chaos in social learning with multiple true states," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(22), pages 5786-5792.
    58. Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021. "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers 614, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jun 2021.
    59. Syngjoo Choi & Edoardo Gallo & Shachar Kariv, 2015. "Networks in the laboratory," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1551, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    60. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    61. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    62. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    63. Salvatore Piccolo & Emanuele Tarantino, 2011. "Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good?," CSEF Working Papers 294, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    64. Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & , & ,, 2015. "Communication and influence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    65. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "Communication and Commitment with Constraints in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962239, HAL.
    66. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2012. "Anticipating Future Expected Utility and Coordination Motives for Information Decisions in Networks," Working Papers DTE 536, CIDE, División de Economía.

Articles

  1. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018. "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 139-165.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(3), pages 163-175, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Thomas Trégouët, 2017. "Truthtelling in Matching Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 882-909, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2016. "Full disclosure in decentralized organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 5-7.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2011. "Centralizing information in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 149-162, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 8 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (6) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2010-04-17 2011-04-30 2012-01-03 2012-12-06. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2011-04-30 2012-12-06 2018-06-11. Author is listed
  3. NEP-NET: Network Economics (4) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2010-04-17 2011-04-30
  4. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (3) 2009-03-22 2009-05-23 2011-04-30
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2012-01-03 2012-12-06
  6. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (2) 2009-05-23 2010-04-17
  7. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2018-06-11
  8. NEP-ICT: Information and Communication Technologies (1) 2010-04-17

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