The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.001
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Other versions of this item:
- Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 1-8.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01629301, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ahçi, Mustafa, 2023. "Essays on corporate disclosures, innovation, and investments," Other publications TiSEM 0dddb5f7-17e1-41ba-97da-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 50-57.
- Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023. "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Analogy-based expectations; Signaling; Streisand effect;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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