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Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent

Author

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  • Jeanne Hagenbach

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Koessler

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We consider a single psychological agent whose utility depends on his action, the state of the world, and the belief that he holds about that state. The agent is initially informed about the state and decides whether to memorize it, otherwise he has no recall. We model the memorization process by a multi-self game in which the privately informed first self voluntarily discloses information to the second self, who has identical preferences and acts upon the disclosed information. We identify broad categories of psychological utility functions for which there exists an equilibrium in which every state is voluntarily memorized. In contrast, if there are exogenous failures in the memorization process, then the agent memorizes states selectively. In this case, we characterize the partially informative equilibria for common classes of psychological utilities. If the material cost of forgetting is low, then the agent only memorizes good enough news. Otherwise, only extreme news are voluntarily memorized.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2021. "Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-03151009, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-03151009
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03151009
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    2. Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2022. "Selective memory of a psychological agent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    3. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    4. Andrea Amelio & Florian Zimmermann, 2023. "Motivated Memory in Economics—A Review," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, January.
    5. Le Yaouanq, Yves, 2023. "A model of voting with motivated beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 394-408.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-self game; Disclosure games; Imperfect recall; Selective memory; Motivated beliefs; Psychological games; Anticipatory utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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