Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma
Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners?dilemma. We ?nd conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner?s only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them di¤erent pieces of information. We also ? nd conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner?s best equilibria.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912|
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