Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
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- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 245-267, May.
- Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma," Working Papers 2010-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsInformation disclosure; generalized prisoners' dilemma; uninformative equilibria; partially or fully informative equilibria;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-10-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-23 (Game Theory)
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