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Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Listed author(s):
  • Kfir Eliaz

    ()

    (Brown University)

  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

    (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences Institute)

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

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File URL: http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2010-20.pdf
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Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2010-20.

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Date of creation: 12 Oct 2010
Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2010-20
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  1. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1751, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-314, May.
  3. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
  5. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  6. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
  7. Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015. "Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
  8. Siew Hong Teoh, 1997. "Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 385-406, Autumn.
  9. Luis Rayo & Ilya Segal, 2010. "Optimal Information Disclosure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 949-987.
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