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Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

  • Kfir Eliaz

    ()

    (Brown University)

  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

    (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences Institute)

Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

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File URL: http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2010-20.pdf
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Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2010-20.

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Date of creation: 12 Oct 2010
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Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2010-20
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