Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design
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- Watson, Joel & Bull, Jesse, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7973v805, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsmechanism-design model; evidence production;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
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