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Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost

Listed author(s):
  • Bull Jesse

    ()

    (Florida International University)

This paper addresses how a moderate evidence disclosure cost can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. The paper shows that in public-action settings with transferable utility one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms. Under complete information with two or more players, a version of this type of mechanism can be used to eliminate evidence production in equilibrium. The paper also provides conditions on the evidence environment under which the class of mechanisms studied in Bull and Watson (2004) is equivalent to those considered here.

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File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2008.8.1/bejte.2008.8.1.1446/bejte.2008.8.1.1446.xml?format=INT
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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 1-20

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:15
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
  2. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 447-456.
  4. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
  5. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
  6. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
  7. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
  8. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  9. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1715-1736, November.
  10. Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
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