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Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

Author

Listed:
  • Mehdi Ayouni

    (Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Frédéric Koessler

    (Paris School of Economics-CNRS)

Abstract

This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(3), pages 327-339, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:82:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-016-9575-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9575-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence reading mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 375-397, October.
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    6. Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman, 2001. "original papers : Implementation with partial verification," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 63-84.
    7. Subir Bose & Ludovic Renou, 2014. "Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82, pages 1853-1872, September.
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    11. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
    12. , & ,, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    13. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
    14. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    15. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2012. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," Working Papers 446, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    16. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
    17. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
    18. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00754592 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    20. Sher, Itai, 2011. "Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 409-419, March.
    21. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1715-1736, November.
    22. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    2. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    3. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
    4. Feng, Xin, 2024. "Ambiguous persuasion in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 182-201.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity; Certifiable information; Evidence disclosure; Mechanism design; Maxmin expected utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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