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original papers : Implementation with partial verification

Author

Listed:
  • Nirvikar Singh

    () (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA)

  • Donald Wittman

    () (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA)

Abstract

This paper examines the implementability of social choice functions when only partial verification of private information is possible. Green and Laffont (1986) used this framework to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the revelation principle to continue to hold with partial verification. We provide economically interesting characterizations of this condition, which suggest that it may be too restrictive. This leads us to consider implementation (not necessarily truthful) in general, when there is partial verification. We consider the case where compensatory transfers are allowed, giving the mechanism designer further leeway. We show how partial verification may allow efficient implementation of bilateral trade, where it would otherwise not be possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman, 2001. "original papers : Implementation with partial verification," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 6(1), pages 63-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:63-84
    Note: Received: 1 August 1998 / Accepted: 5 September 2000
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    Cited by:

    1. Sher, Itai & Vohra, Rakesh, 2015. "Price discrimination through communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; partial verification; mechanism design; revelation principle;

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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