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An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

  • Anderhub, Vital
  • Engelmann, Dirk
  • Guth, Werner

In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a human participant who may decide opportunistically. To allow for reputation formation, this game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analysed since participants play successively several repeated games with changed partners. In our computerized experiment, participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 48 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 197-216

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:2:p:197-216
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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  1. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  2. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
  3. Brandts, Jordi & Figueras, Neus, 2003. "An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 89-115, January.
  4. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1993. "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 51-73.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  6. Ulrich Kamecke, 1997. "note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 409-417.
  7. Ochs Jack, 1995. "Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 202-217, July.
  8. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  9. Neral, John & Ochs, Jack, 1992. "The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1151-69, September.
  10. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  11. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
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