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Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation

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  • Guth, Werner
  • Ockenfels, Peter
  • Wendel, Markus

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  • Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:15-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
    2. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1993. "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(1), pages 51-73.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-836, July.
    4. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
    5. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May.
    6. Bolle, Friedel & Ockenfels, Peter, 1990. "Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 69-84, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benchekroun, Hassan & Long, Ngo Van, 2008. "The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 239-252, July.
    2. Anderhub, Vital & Engelmann, Dirk & Guth, Werner, 2002. "An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 197-216, June.
    3. Schniter, Eric & Sheremeta, Roman & Shields, Timothy, 2015. "The Problem with All-or-nothing Trust Games: What Others Choose Not to Do Matters In Trust-based Exchange," MPRA Paper 68561, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Jörg Rieskamp & Peter Todd, 2006. "The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 69-111, February.
    5. Cochard, Francois & Nguyen Van, Phu & Willinger, Marc, 2004. "Trusting behavior in a repeated investment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 31-44, September.
    6. Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012. "Competition fosters trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 195-209.
    7. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2012. "The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken: an experimental study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 65-87, January.
    8. Eric Schniter & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2013. "Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing Investments," Working Papers 13-24, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Ryan Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James Parco, 2006. "The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 147-166, June.
    10. Burks, Stephen V. & Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Verhoogen, Eric, 2003. "Playing both roles in the trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-216, June.
    11. Buskens, Vincent, 2003. "Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 235-252, February.
    12. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger, 2007. "The role of players’ identification in the population on the trusting and the trustworthy behavior an experimental investigation," Working Papers 07-06, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2007.
    13. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2008. "Cooperation in a Game of Chicken with Heterogeneous Agents: An Experimental Study," CIRED Working Papers hal-00395939, HAL.
    14. Greiner, Ben & Vittoria Levati, M., 2005. "Indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 711-731, October.
    15. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Daniere, Amrita G. & Takahashi, Lois M., 2004. "Cooperation, trust, and social capital in Southeast Asian urban slums," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 533-551, December.
    16. Clot, Sophie & Stanton, Charlotte Y., 2014. "Present bias predicts participation in payments for environmental services: Evidence from a behavioral experiment in Uganda," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 162-170.
    17. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
    18. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00395939 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters, 2006. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 769-791.
    20. Yang, Fanzheng, 2013. "Using laboratory experiments to study otherwise unobservable labor market interactions," ISU General Staff Papers 201301010800004100, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    21. Sophie Clot & Charlotte Stanton, 2014. "Present Bias in Payments for Ecosystem Services: Insights from a Behavioural Experiment in Uganda," Working Papers 14-03, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2014.

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