Fall back equilibrium
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.
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- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
445, David K. Levine.
- Borm, P.E.M., 1992. "On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games," Other publications TiSEM 9652c2b4-b09f-4c05-846a-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jansen, Mathijs, 1993. "On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 97-106.
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