# Fall back equilibrium

## Author

Listed:
• Kleppe, John
• Borm, Peter
• Hendrickx, Ruud

## Abstract

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.

## Suggested Citation

• Kleppe, John & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2012. "Fall back equilibrium," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 372-379.
• Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:223:y:2012:i:2:p:372-379
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221712003074

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## References listed on IDEAS

as
1. Borm, P.E.M., 1992. "On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games," Other publications TiSEM 9652c2b4-b09f-4c05-846a-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
2. Jansen, Mathijs, 1993. "On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 97-106.
3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Citations

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Cited by:

1. repec:spr:topjnl:v:25:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11750-017-0447-2 is not listed on IDEAS
2. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:2:p:171-186 is not listed on IDEAS
3. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2013. "Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 171-186, October.

### Keywords

Strategic game; Equilibrium refinement; Blocked action; Fall back equilibrium; Bimatrix game;

### JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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