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Fall back equilibrium

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  • Kleppe, John
  • Borm, Peter
  • Hendrickx, Ruud

Abstract

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underlying thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play his primary action.

Suggested Citation

  • Kleppe, John & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2012. "Fall back equilibrium," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 372-379.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:223:y:2012:i:2:p:372-379
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.04.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-François Mertens, 1989. "Stable Equilibria---A Reformulation," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 575-625, November.
    2. MERTENS, Jean-François, 1989. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation. Part I. Definition and basic properties," LIDAM Reprints CORE 866, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Jansen, Mathijs, 1993. "On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 97-106.
    4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    5. Borm, P.E.M., 1992. "On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games," Other publications TiSEM 9652c2b4-b09f-4c05-846a-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. MERTENS, Jean-François, 1991. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the definition, and further results," LIDAM Reprints CORE 960, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2017. "Fall back proper equilibrium," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(2), pages 402-412, July.
    2. John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2013. "Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 171-186, October.
    3. van Beek, Andries, 2023. "Solutions in multi-actor projects with collaboration and strategic incentives," Other publications TiSEM 3739c498-5edb-442f-87d8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic game; Equilibrium refinement; Blocked action; Fall back equilibrium; Bimatrix game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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