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When To Run And When To Hide: Electoral Coordination And Exit

  • INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON

Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordination is also the causal mechanism behind any explanation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. I present a dynamic model of electoral coordination with candidate exit. The model extends two important results from the literature to a dynamic setting. The extension of Duverger's Law and the median-voter theorem also offers a simultaneous prediction of the number of parties and their ideological positions. Coordination failure is shown to be possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.

Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 80-105

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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:80-105
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