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The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case

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  • Jon X. Eguia

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  • Jon X. Eguia, 2013. "The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 313-334, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:25:y:2013:i:3:p:313-334
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    1. Hoadley, John F., 1980. "The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789–1803," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 757-779, September.
    2. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
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    10. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
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    16. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
    17. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    18. Dewan, Torun & Spirling, Arthur, 2011. "Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 337-358, May.
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    21. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    22. Jon X. Eguia, 2011. "Endogenous Parties in an Assembly," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 16-26, January.
    23. Carroll, Royce & Lewis, Jeffrey B. & Lo, James & Poole, Keith T. & Rosenthal, Howard, 2009. "Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in DW-NOMINATE Ideal Point Estimates via the Parametric Bootstrap," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 261-275, July.
    24. Schwartz, Thomas, 1977. "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 999-1010, September.
    25. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
    26. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
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