Strategic Timing in R&D Agreements
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marini, Marco A., 2016.
"Collusive Agreements in Vertically Differentiated Markets,"
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- Marco A. Marini, 2017. "Collusive Agreements in Vertically Differentiated Markets," Working Papers 2017.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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"Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device,"
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- Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2017. "Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device," DIAG Technical Reports 2017-09, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
More about this item
KeywordsR&D Investment; Spillovers; Endogenous Timing; R&D Alliances; Endogenous Research Cartels;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-12-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2012-12-10 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2012-12-10 (Innovation)
- NEP-KNM-2012-12-10 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-SBM-2012-12-10 (Small Business Management)
- NEP-TID-2012-12-10 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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