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A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games

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  • Currarini, Sergio
  • Marini, Marco

Abstract

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 2002. "A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games," MPRA Paper 33381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    2. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    3. Carraro,Carlo & Siniscalco,Domenico (ed.), 1997. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521590891, Enero-Abr.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hirai, Toshiyuki & Masuzawa, Takuya & Nakayama, Mikio, 2006. "Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 162-170, March.
    2. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2015. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 253-287, June.
    3. Marco Marini & Giorgio Rodano, 2012. "Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    4. Marco Marini & Giorgio Rodano, 2011. "Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games," Working Papers 1112, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2011.
    5. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2006. "Coalition Formation In Games Without Synergies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 111-126.
    6. Marco A. Marini & Maria L. Petit & Roberta Sestini, 2014. "Strategic timing in R&D agreements," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 274-303, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General

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