Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Spillovers
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- Currarini, Sergio, 2007. "Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 187-202, December.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2004. "On Group Stability in Hierarchies and Networks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 754-778, August.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1982. "Cores of partitioning games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 313-327, December.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
- Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171.
- Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
- Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-1146, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2017. "The stability of group formation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 495-516.
- Sergio Currarini, 2007. "Network design in games with spillovers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(4), pages 305-326, March.
- Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2013. "Majority Rule and Coalitional Stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 1660-1668.
More about this item
KeywordsOrganizational design; networks; group stability; spillovers.;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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