IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ven/wpaper/2006_49.html

Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Carlo Carraro

    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca� Foscari)

Abstract

This paper comments and assesses �Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures�, a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World", organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor�s proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Carraro, 2006. "Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy," Working Papers 2006_49, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    • Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_49
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.unive.it/web/fileadmin/user_upload/dipartimenti/DEC/doc/Pubblicazioni_scientifiche/working_papers/2006/WP_DSE_Carraro_49_06.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin (ed.), 1991. "International Trade and Trade Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262081997, December.
    2. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    3. Demange,Gabrielle & Wooders,Myrna (ed.), 2005. "Group Formation in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842716, January.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Carlo Carraro (ed.), 2003. "The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2999, August.
    6. Sang-Seung, Yi, 1996. "Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 153-177, August.
    7. Gabrielle Demange & Wooders Myrna, 2005. "Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs and Coalitions," Post-Print halshs-00576778, HAL.
    8. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Parallel Climate Blocs. Incentives to cooperation in international climate negotiations," Working Papers 2006_45, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    9. Hoel Michael, 1994. "Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 259-274, November.
    10. BLOCH, Francis & FERRER, Hélène, 1999. "Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Richard Baldwin, 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Papers 4465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, 2003. "Reconstructing Climate Policy," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53156, September.
    13. Robert Reinstein, 2004. "A Possible Way Forward on Climate Change," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 245-309, July.
    14. Sang-Seung Yi, 1996. "Open Regionalism and World Welfare," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 467-475, Fall.
    15. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    16. Casella, Alessandra, 1996. "Large countries, small countries and the enlargement of trade blocs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 389-415, February.
    17. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    18. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1998. "International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 561-572, May.
    19. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
    20. Carraro,Carlo & Siniscalco,Domenico (ed.), 1997. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521590891, January.
    21. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hansjürgens, Bernd, 2008. "Internationale Klimapolitik nach Kyoto: Architekturen und Institutionen," UFZ Discussion Papers 10/2008, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    2. Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, 2008. "Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture," NBER Working Papers 14432, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Joseph E. Aldy & Alan J. Krupnick & Richard G. Newell & Ian W. H. Parry & William A. Pizer, 2010. "Designing Climate Mitigation Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 903-934, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carraro, Carlo & Buchner, Barbara, 2005. "Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Parallel Climate Blocs. Incentives to cooperation in international climate negotiations," Working Papers 2006_45, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Wood, Peter John, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory: a Mathematical Survey," Working Papers 249379, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
    4. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(3), pages 411-425, March.
    6. Achim Hagen & Klaus Eisenack, 2019. "Climate Clubs Versus Single Coalitions: The Ambition Of International Environmental Agreements," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 1-19, August.
    7. Carlo Carraro, 2014. "International environmental cooperation," Chapters, in: Giles Atkinson & Simon Dietz & Eric Neumayer & Matthew Agarwala (ed.), Handbook of Sustainable Development, chapter 26, pages 418-431, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Marco Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalition & Network Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0712, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2007.
    9. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2002. "Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 423-447, August.
    10. Marco A. Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0707, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2007.
    11. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Duval, Romain & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Sustainable Development Papers 54281, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    13. Al Khourdajie, Alaa & Finus, Michael, 2020. "Measures to enhance the effectiveness of international climate agreements: The case of border carbon adjustments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    14. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
    15. Ana Mauleon & Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 471-500, June.
    16. Baran Doda & Simon Quemin & Luca Taschini, 2017. "A Theory of Gains from Trade in Multilaterally Linked ETSs," Working Papers 1706, Chaire Economie du climat.
    17. Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti, 2010. "International Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from Theory," Chapters, in: Emilio Cerdá Tena & Xavier Labandeira (ed.), Climate Change Policies, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2010. "The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 36(2), pages 93-119, August.
    19. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
    20. Carraro, Carlo & Buchner, Barbara & Cersosimo, Igor & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sassano Sonia (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dsvenit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.