Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy
This paper comments and assesses �Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures�, a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World", organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor�s proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia|
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