Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.
|Date of creation:||07 Jan 1999|
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- Martin Shubik, 1977. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 462, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- BLOCH, Francis & GHOSAL, Sayantan, 1994.
"Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bloch, Francis & Ghosal, Sayantan, 1997. "Stable Trading Structures in Bilateral Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 368-384, June.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-968, October.
- Gabszewicz, J. & Michel, P., 1992.
"Oligopoly Equilibria in Exchange Economies,"
Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications
92.26, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Gabszewicz, J.J. & Michel, P., "undated". "Oligopoly equilibrium in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1265, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean & MICHEL, Philippe, 1992. "Oligopoly equilibria in exchange economies," CORE Discussion Papers 1992047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cordella, Tito & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 1998.
""Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 162-169, January.
- Cordella, T. & Gabszewicz, J. J., "undated". ""Nice'' trivial equilibria in strategic market games," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1302, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Rabah Amir & Siddhartha Sahi & Martin Shubik, 1986.
"A Strategic Market Game with Complete Markets,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
814R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 1987.
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