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"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games


  • Cordella, Tito
  • Gabszewicz, Jean J.


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  • Cordella, Tito & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 1998. ""Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 162-169, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:1:p:162-169

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Amir, Rabah & Sahi, Siddharta & Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "A strategic market game with complete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 126-143, June.
    2. Dubey, Pradeep & Shubik, Martin, 1978. "A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The non-cooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Martin Shubik & Jingang Zhao, 1990. "A Strategic Market Game of a Finite Economy with a Mutual Bank," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 961, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis & Ferrer, Helene, 2001. "Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-87, January.
    2. Ludovic Alexandre Julien, 2017. "Hierarchical competition and heterogeneous behavior in noncooperative oligopoly markets," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-22, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Ludovic A. Julien, 2015. "A note on market power in bilateral oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 400-406.
    4. Régis Breton & Bertrand Gobillard, 2005. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Post-Print halshs-00257207, HAL.
    5. Gabszewicz, Jean J & Grazzini, Lisa, 1999. " Taxing Market Power," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 475-497.
    6. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    7. Iván Barreda Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzis & Nikolas Ziros, 2015. "Market games as social dilemmas," Working Papers 2015/10, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    8. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Michael Florig, 2005. "Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 65-71, July.
    9. Ludovic A. Julien & Fabrice Tricou, 2008. "Market Price Mechanisms and Stackelberg General Equilibria," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    10. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 2000. "Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes," CORE Discussion Papers 2000063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Ludovic A. Julien & Fabrice Tricou, 2010. "Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(2), pages 175-194.
    12. Bio-Akanni ELEGBEDE, 2017. "Oligopoly Equilibrium with differentiated commodities: a computation of two models," Working Papers CREGO 1171201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    13. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
    14. Dmitry Levando, 2012. "A Survey Of Strategic Market Games," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(194), pages 63-106, July - Se.
    15. BLOCH, Francis & FERRER, Hélène, 1999. "Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers 1999008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    16. Gaël Giraud, 2000. "Notes sur les jeux stratégiques de marchés," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 257-272.

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