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Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies

  • Ludovic A. Julien

    (Economix, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre)

  • Fabrice Tricou

    (Economix, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre)

This paper introduces two equilibrium concepts which extend the notion of Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmarks of Cournot-Walras economies and the strategic market games, the introduction of an active leader modifies the working of market power and the configuration of strategic interactions. In the context of a simple pure exchange economy, asymptotic identification and welfare results are thus obtained, about Stackelberg general equilibria, compared to Cournot general equilibria and to the competitive equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2010023.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010023
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  1. Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2008. "Cournot-Walras Equilibrium as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 837, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Cordella, Tito & Gabszewicz, Jean J., 1998. ""Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 162-169, January.
  3. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
  4. D'Aspremont, C. & Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1992. "General Equilibrium Concepts Under Imperfect Competition: A Cournotien Approach," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 92a03, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  5. Codognato, Giulio & Gabszewicz, Jean J, 1993. "Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 453-64, July.
  6. CODOGNATO, Giulio & GHOSAL, Sayantan, . "Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1461, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & GRAZZINI, Lisa, . "Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1511, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  9. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
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