IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01385854.html

On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Ludovic A. Julien

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ludovic A. Julien, 2013. "On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange," Post-Print hal-01385854, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385854
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review," EconomiX Working Papers 2025-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Ludovic A. Julien, 2024. "Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 325-371, June.
    3. Ludovic A. Julien, 2017. "Hierarchical competition and heterogeneous behavior in noncooperative oligopoly markets," Working Papers hal-04141649, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385854. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.