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"Nice'' trivial equilibria in strategic market games

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  • CORDELLA, T.
  • GABSZEWICZ, J. J.

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Suggested Citation

  • Cordella, T. & Gabszewicz, J. J., 1998. ""Nice'' trivial equilibria in strategic market games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1302, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1302
    DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0569
    Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 22, 162-169, 1998
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    Cited by:

    1. Régis Breton & Bertrand Gobillard, 2006. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Working Papers hal-04138854, HAL.
    2. Ludovic A. Julien, 2015. "A note on market power in bilateral oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 400-406.
    3. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Ludovic A. Julien & Fabrice Tricou, 2008. "Market Price Mechanisms and Stackelberg General Equilibria," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Ziros, Nicholas, 2018. "Market games as social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 435-444.
    6. Bloch, Francis & Ferrer, Helene, 2001. "Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-87, January.
    7. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Lisa Grazzini, 1999. "Taxing Market Power," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 475-497, October.
    8. Cordella, Tito & Onder, Harun, 2020. "Sharing oil rents and political violence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 2000. "Strategic multilateral exchange and taxes," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Régis Breton & Bertrand Gobillard, 2005. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Post-Print halshs-00257207, HAL.
    11. Ludovic A. Julien, 2017. "Hierarchical competition and heterogeneous behavior in noncooperative oligopoly markets," Working Papers hal-04141649, HAL.
    12. Cyrinus B. Elegbede & Ludovic A. Julien & Louis Mesnard, 2022. "On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 43-73, March.
    13. Bio-Akanni ELEGBEDE, 2017. "Oligopoly Equilibrium with differentiated commodities: a computation of two models," Working Papers CREGO 1171201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    14. Ludovic A. Julien & Fabrice Tricou, 2010. "Oligopoly Equilibria “à la Stackelberg” in Pure Exchange Economies," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(2), pages 175-194.
    15. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
    16. Dmitry Levando, 2012. "A Survey Of Strategic Market Games," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(194), pages 63-106, July - Se.
    17. BLOCH, Francis & FERRER, Hélène, 1999. "Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    18. Gaël Giraud, 2000. "Notes sur les jeux stratégiques de marchés," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 257-272.
    19. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Michael Florig, 2005. "Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 65-71, July.

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