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Trade Fragmentation and Coordination in Strategic Market Games

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Bloch

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Hélène Ferrer

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one price in three strategic market games with multiple trading posts. In bilateral oligopolies, where traders have corner endowments in one commodity, all agents participate in all the markets. The law of one price holds in bilateral oligopolies and in the buy-or-sell market game, where equilibrium strategies are locally unique. When traders can simultaneously buy and sell on every market, the law of one price fails and the set of equilibrium prices generically has the same dimension as the number of active markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Hélène Ferrer, 2001. "Trade Fragmentation and Coordination in Strategic Market Games," Post-Print halshs-02174875, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02174875
    DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2730
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bloch, Francis & Ferrer, Helene, 2001. "Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 83-87, January.
    2. Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2020. "Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 525-546, June.
    3. Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2015. "Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 1-14.
    4. Régis Breton & Bertrand Gobillard, 2006. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Working Papers hal-04138854, HAL.
    5. Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review," EconomiX Working Papers 2025-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    6. Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2018. "Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 184-200.
    7. Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2014. "Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-23, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    8. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal & Ludovic Julien & Simone Tonin, 2020. "Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 933-951, December.
    9. A. Dickson & R. Hartley, 2005. "The strategic Marshallian cross and bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0523, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    10. Ludovic A. Julien & Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2024. "Pareto-Optimal Taxation Mechanism in Noncooperative Strategic Bilateral Exchange," Working Papers hal-04604299, HAL.
    11. Toraubally, Waseem A., 2018. "Large market games, the law of one price, and market structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 13-26.
    12. Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Tonin, Simone, 2018. "Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 478-485.
    13. Amir, Rabah & Bloch, Francis, 2009. "Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 7-24, January.
    14. Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel, 2007. "Increasing returns, entrepreneurship and imperfect competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 1-19, January.
    15. Ludovic A. Julien, 2024. "Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 325-371, June.
    16. Régis Breton & Bertrand Gobillard, 2005. "Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games," Post-Print halshs-00257207, HAL.
    17. Nicholas Ziros, 2015. "The law of one price in a modified strategic market game," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 233-241, October.
    18. Dickson, Alex & Hartley, Roger, 2008. "The strategic Marshallian cross," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 514-532, November.
    19. Cont, Walter & Porto, Guido, 2014. "Measuring the impact of a change in the price of Cashew received by exporters on farmgate prices and poverty in Guinea-Bissau," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7036, The World Bank.
    20. Ludovic A. Julien, 2017. "Hierarchical competition and heterogeneous behavior in noncooperative oligopoly markets," Working Papers hal-04141649, HAL.
    21. Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Julien, Ludovic, 2020. "Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 318-327.
    22. M. Lombardi & S. Tonin, 2020. "On trade in bilateral oligopolies with altruistic and spiteful agents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 203-218, October.
    23. Dmitry Levando, 2012. "A Survey Of Strategic Market Games," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(194), pages 63-106, July - Se.
    24. Kim, Eungsik & Spear, Stephen, 2025. "The rich are not like you and me: Income, price dispersion, and consumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    25. Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2014. "Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-23, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

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