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Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

Author

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  • Gabrielle Demange

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange, 2024. "Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games," Working Papers halshs-04335830, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-04335830
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04335830v2
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