The strategic timing of R&D agreements
We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investment is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the noncooperative formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. Our approach allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable R&D agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, to be stable a R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, avoiding any delay. When instead R&D spillover rates are sufficiently high, the cooperation in R&D constitutes a profitable option, although firms also possess the incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge leaks mainly from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely profitable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/|
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- van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2004.
"Endogenous price leadership,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 404-420, May.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1998. "Endogenous price leadership," Discussion Paper 98.68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, S., 2004. "Endogenous price leadership," Other publications TiSEM 0bc41e9f-cede-46e7-bab6-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 2001. "Endogenous price leadership," Economics Working Papers 581, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1998. "Endogenous price leadership," Economics Working Papers 289, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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- von Stengel, Bernhard, 2010. "Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 512-516, July.
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