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R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers

Author

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  • Gamal Atallah

Abstract

This paper analyses R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that the change in R&D by a firm following cooperation is proportional to the gap between the spillover rate transmitted by that firm and a critical level of spillovers. In consequence, cooperation increases total R&D investments when the average of firms' spillover rates is sufficiently high. Whereas with symmetric spillovers cooperation is always beneficial to firms, with asymmetric spillovers only a very limited range of spillovers makes cooperation beneficial to both firms. Asymmetries also create a potential conflict between maximizing total welfare and maximizing effective cost reduction.

Suggested Citation

  • Gamal Atallah, 2005. "R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 919-936, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:38:y:2005:i:3:p:919-936
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tran, Tat Thanh & Zikos, Vasileios, 2017. "R&D networks among suppliers and manufacturers," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 151-161.
    2. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2017. "Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device," DIAG Technical Reports 2017-09, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:18:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    5. Eren Inci, 2009. "R&D tax incentives: a reappraisal," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(6), pages 797-821, December.
    6. Lhuillery, Stéphane & Pfister, Etienne, 2009. "R&D cooperation and failures in innovation projects: Empirical evidence from French CIS data," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 45-57, February.
    7. Marco A. Marini & Maria L. Petit & Roberta Sestini, 2014. "Strategic timing in R&D agreements," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 274-303, April.
    8. Ki H. Kang & Jina Kang, 2009. "Does Partner Type Matter in R&D Collaboration for Product Innovation?," TEMEP Discussion Papers 200906, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Aug 2009.
    9. Marek Jemala, 2009. "Strategic Business Alliances: Qualitative Analysis of Specific Factors of Business Clusters," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2009(4), pages 19-33.
    10. Müller, Aranja & Zaby, Alexandra, 2015. "Research Joint Ventures and Technological Proximity," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112989, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Deming Zeng & Luyun Xu & Xia-an Bi, 2017. "Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 32-60, March.
    12. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2016. "Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 179-188.
    13. Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2012. "Spillovers of innovation activities and their profitability," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 302-322, April.
    14. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-24, CIRANO.
    15. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2012. "What is the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D?," IDEC DP2 Series 2-6, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
    16. Kesavayuth, Dusanee & Lee, Sang-Ho & Zikos, Vasileios, 2017. "Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry," MPRA Paper 79821, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Falvey, Rod & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Teerasuwannajak, Khemarat Talerngsri, 2013. "Coordination costs and research joint ventures," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 965-976.
    18. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Working Papers 2014.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    19. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(18), pages 1-11.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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