Asymmetric Spillovers And Investments In Research And Development Of Leaders And Followers
The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) when sequential moves are taken into account. Leading firms move before followers in investment and in output choices in a four stage game setting. Leaders may compete or cooperate in R&D with other leaders, given that followers compete. Followers may compete or cooperate in R&D with other followers given that leaders compete. There may be spillovers between leaders and between followers and also between these two groups of players. Due to the complexity of the model, results are obtained by numerical simulations. The impact of symmetric spillovers is similar but not identical to the tendencies in two stage models with simultaneous R&D moves. A relatively wide set of circumstances is identified where followers tend to invest more than leaders. Critical spillover values are identified that drive the effects of cooperation in R&D as is the case in simpler settings. Situations are detailed, where consumer surplus and static welfare are best served by cooperation of followers rather than cooperation of leaders.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 17 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GEIN20 |
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GEIN20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:17:y:2008:i:5:p:417-433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.