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Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment

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  • Suetens, Sigrid

Abstract

We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments.

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  • Suetens, Sigrid, 2008. "Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 822-836, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:822-836
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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