Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment
We examine in a laboratory experiment whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities and a contract treatment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract, are run. We find that the degree of price collusion in the contract treatments is significantly higher in periods where R&D contracts are made than in periods without contracts, and than in the baseline treatments.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988.
"Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, "undated". "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP 823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Roberto Hern·n & Pedro L. MarÌn & Georges Siotis, 2003.
"An empirical evaluation of the determinants of Research Joint Venture Formation,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 75-89, 03.
- Hernán, Roberto & Marín Uribe, Pedro Luis & Siotis, Georges, 2000. "An Empirical Evaluation Of The Determinants Of Research Joint Venture Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
- Amir, Rabah, 2000.
"Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1013-1032, October.
- Rabah Amir, 1998. "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Jeroen Hinloopen, 2003. "R&D Efficiency Gains Due to Cooperation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 107-125, October.
- Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G., 1997.
"Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures,"
97-06, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg, 1998. "Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 195-208, March.
- Cason, Timothy N & Mason, Charles F, 1999. "Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(2), pages 258-281, April.
- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-1320, December.
- Keser, Claudia, 2000. "Cooperation in symmetric duopolies with demand inertia," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 23-38, January.
- Martin, Stephen, 1996. "R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 733-741, April.
- Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
- Henriques, Irene, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 638-640, June.
- Belderbos, Rene & Carree, Martin A & Diederen, Bert & Lokshin, Boris & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 2003.
"Heterogeneity in R&D Cooperation Strategies,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Petit, Maria Luisa & Tolwinski, Boleslaw, 1999. "R&D cooperation or competition?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 185-208, January.
- Nicholas S. Vonortas, 2000. "Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 243-271.
- Holt, Charles A, 1985. "An Experimental Test of the Consistent-Conjectures Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 314-325, June.
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Reynolds, Stanley S., 1992. "Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-100, January.
- Suetens, S., 2003. "A Duopoly Experiment on Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D," Discussion Paper 2003-77, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2001. "Market volatility and inequality in earnings: experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 363-368, March.
- Bruno Cassiman & Reinhilde Veugelers, 2002. "R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence from Belgium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1169-1184, September.
- Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004.
"Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2001. "Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse12_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Cason, Timothy N., 1995. "Cheap talk price signaling in laboratory markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 183-204, June.
- Lambertini, Luca & Poddar, Sougata & Sasaki, Dan, 2002. "Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 829-854, June.
- Kaiser, Ulrich, 2002. "An empirical test of models explaining research expenditures and research cooperation: evidence for the German service sector," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 747-774, June.
- Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-1306, December.
- Suetens, Sigrid, 2005. "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in experimental duopoly markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 63-82, February.
- Andrew Brod & Ram Shivakumar, 1997. "R&D Cooperation and the Joint Exploitation of R&D," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 673-684, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:3-4:p:822-836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.