Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device

This paper focusseses on the strategic use of firm's R&D agreements to overcome R&D inefficiencies in presence of asymmetric information and research spillovers. We introduce a duopoly game where initially one firm is not fully informed on its rival's R&D productivity.We show that, without R&D agreements, the usual underinvestment problem can be exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric information. However, by proposing a R&D agreement,the uninformed firm may not only gain from the internalization of R&D investment spillovers,but also use it strategically as a screening device to assess the true type of its rival. According to the model, firms are more likely to pursuit R&D agreements in presence of similar productivity and less when their productivity gap is high. This is consistent with the empirical findings highlighting the importance of firm's similarities for R&D collaborations.