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Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation

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  • Gamal Atallah

    (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa)

Abstract

In this paper we extend the R&D cooperation model to asymmetric firms, focusing on the incentives for cooperating with firms characterized by different levels of efficiency. Three firms differentiated by their cost levels invest in cost-reducing R&D before competing in output. Firms may cooperate in R&D, which implies both R&D coordination and perfect information sharing. It is found that firms' preferences over whom to cooperate with depend on spillovers and on cost differences between firms. With low (high) spillovers, a firm prefers to cooperate with the most (least) efficient among the remaining firms. As the cost differential between firms increases, efficient (inefficient) firms prefer to cooperate with the most (least) efficient firm more often. For very high spillovers, a firm prefers to be excluded from R&D cooperation. The equilibrium configuration is that the most efficient firms cooperate for low spillovers, while all firms cooperate for intermediate spillovers. For high spillovers, the equilibrium is for all firms to cooperate when the cost differential is sufficiently low, but depends on the bargaining mechanism when the cost differential is high. The model constitutes a generalization of the standard R&D model with symmetric firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," Working Papers 0503E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ott:wpaper:0503e
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:18:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    4. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(18), pages 1-11.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D cooperation; Research joint ventures; Asymmetric firms; R&D spillovers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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