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The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support for private innovation

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  • Martin, Stephen
  • Scott, John T.

Abstract

We relate the sources of innovation market failure to the dominant mode of sectoral innovation and outline mechanisms for public support of innovation that target specific sources of innovation market failure.
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Suggested Citation

  • Martin, Stephen & Scott, John T., 2000. "The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support for private innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 437-447, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:29:y:2000:i:4-5:p:437-447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bronwyn H. Hall, 1992. "Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level: Does the Source of Financing Matter?," NBER Working Papers 4096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Josh Lerner, 1996. "The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Effects of the SBIR Program," NBER Working Papers 5753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kohn, Meir & Scott, John T, 1982. "Scale Economies in Research and Development: The Schumpeterian Hypothesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 239-249, March.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
    5. Fisher, Franklin M & Temin, Peter, 1973. "Returns to Scale in Research and Development: What Does the Schumpeterian Hypothesis Imply ?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 56-70, Jan.-Feb..
    6. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
    7. Dosi, Giovanni, 1988. "Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 1120-1171, September.
    8. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Auctions with Contingent Payments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 862-865, September.
    9. Kamien,Morton I. & Schwartz,Nancy L., 1982. "Market Structure and Innovation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521293853, December.
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    12. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
    13. Stephen Martin, 1998. "Product market competition policy and technological performance," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    14. William Samuelson, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1533-1550, December.
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    16. Rajeev K. Goel, 1999. "On contracting for uncertain R&D," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 99-106.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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