Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach
We analyze property crime in an endowment economy composed of a large number of heterogeneous individuals who need to protect themselves, choose whether to participate in crime or not, and decide on how to allocate their predation efforts across victims. The equilibrium posits perfect foresight by all and the crime payoff clears the market between victims’ losses and criminals’ gains. We obtain that the crime payoff summarizes all the relevant information concerning the state of the crime environment as far as individual welfare is concerned. The burden of crime, expressed as losses relative to initial wealth, is evenly distributed between rich and poor individuals, inclusive of the protection effort. In absolute terms, the rich spend more on protection and lose more from crime. We derive a necessary and sufficient under which wealth redistribution increases crime. Under a weak sufficient condition, economic development tends to reduce the burden of crime for all, regardless of how its fruits are distributed. The predictions of the model accord well with existing empirical results
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
| Length: | 29 pages |
| Date of creation: | 2009 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Handle: | RePEc:ott:wpaper:0901e |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: PO Box 450, Station A, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5 Phone: (613) 562-5753 Fax: (613) 562-5999 Web page: http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/eco/eng/index.asp Email: More information through EDIRC
|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ekholm, Karolina & Torstensson, Johan, 1996.
"High-Technology Subsidies in General Equilibrium: A Sector-Specific Approach,"
Working Paper Series
467, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Karolina Ekholm & Johan Torstensson, 1997. "High-Technology Subsidies in General Equilibrium: A Sector-Specific Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1184-1203, November.
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 2002. "R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 37-52, March.
- Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 2002. "Uncertainty, spillovers, and cooperative R&D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 855-876, June.
- Martin, Stephen & Scott, John T., 2000.
"The nature of innovation market failure and the design of public support for private innovation,"
Research Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 437-447, April.
- Stephen Martin & John T. Scott, 1999. "The Nature of Innovation Market Failure and the Design of Public Support for Private Innovation," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Isabel Busom, 2000. "An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 111-148.
- Lakdawalla, Darius & Sood, Neeraj, 2004. "Social insurance and the design of innovation incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 57-61, October.
- Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1998. "R&D Competition in a Mixed Duopoly under Uncertainty and Easy Imitation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 415-428, September.
- Klette, T.J. & Moen, J. & Griliches, Z., 1999. "Do Subsidies to Commercial R&D Reduce Market Failures? Microeconometric Evaluation Studies," Papers 16/99, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Minoru Kitahara & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2006. "Realized Cost-Based Subsidies For Strategic R&D Investments With "Ex Ante" And "Ex Post" Asymmetries," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 57(3), pages 438-448.
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ott:wpaper:0901e. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Diane Ritchot)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.