Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers
The paper analyzes the profitability of R&D cooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization when the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. The equilibrium configuration is RJV cartelization for low spillover asymmetries, R&D competition for intermediate asymmetries, and R&D cartelization for high asymmetries.
Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 18 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Gamal Atallah, 2005.
"Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," Working Papers 0503E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Gamal Atallah, 2005. "R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 919-936, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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