Innovation Strategies in a Competitive Dynamic Setting
This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over the competitive one regardless of the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Accumulation of knowledge capital results allows the monopolist to have lower marginal cost of production and charge a lower market price than a fully competitive duopoly. Being able to define the degree of knowledge exchange when creating a research joint venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available.
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- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-1320, December.
- Salant, S.W. & Shaffer, G., 1997.
"Optimal Asymmetric Strategies in Research Joint Ventures,"
97-06, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- W. Salant, Stephen & Shaffer, Greg, 1998. "Optimal asymmetric strategies in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 195-208, March.
- AMIR, Rabah & EVSTIGNEEV, Igor & WOODERS, John, "undated".
"Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1650, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John, 2003. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 183-207, February.
- AMIR, Rabah & EVSTIGNEEV, Igor & WOODERS, John, 2001. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," CORE Discussion Papers 2001050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Reinganum, Jennifer F., "undated".
"Dynamic Games of Innovation,"
287, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Andrew Brod & Ram Shivakumar, 1997. "R&D Cooperation and the Joint Exploitation of R&D," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 673-684, August.
- Kline, J. Jude, 2000.
"Research joint ventures and the cost paradox,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1049-1065, October.
- Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2000. "Strategic R&D Co-operatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 153-185, June.
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