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Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax

  • Yasunori Ouchida

    (Department of Economics, Hiroshima University)

  • Daisaku Goto

    (Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation Hiroshima University)

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2014.35.

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Date of creation: Mar 2014
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.35
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  1. Jon Vilasuso & Mark R. Frascatore, 2000. "Public policy and R&D when research joint ventures are costly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 818-839, August.
  2. Stuart McDonald & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2012. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal Emissions Taxation," Discussion Papers Series 455, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
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  13. Ouchida, Yasunori & Goto, Daisaku, 2014. "Do emission subsidies reduce emission? In the context of environmental R&D organization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 511-516.
  14. Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 533, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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  19. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
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  24. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2011. "A note on environmental R&D under time-consistent emission tax," IDEC DP2 Series 1-6, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).
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