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Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax

  • Yasunori Ouchida

    (Department of Economics, Hiroshima University)

  • Daisaku Goto

    (Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation Hiroshima University)

This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2014.35.

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Date of creation: Mar 2014
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.35
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