Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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