Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy
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Other versions of this item:
- Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 533, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
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